Quentin Skinner is often held to have advocated the study of intellectual history in opposition to what has traditionally been practiced as political theory. His criticism (along with other members of the “Cambridge School,” notably Dunn and Pocock) of what he saw as widespread anachronism in the study of political theory when he began his work in the late 1960s emphasizes the importance of history to his work. It would be a mistake, however, to regard Skinner as advocating a discipline of intellectual history separate from political theory, leaving the political theorists perhaps free to continue in their anachronism. On the contrary, Skinner’s interest in historically accurate readings of past texts in political theory is due to a belief that historical accuracy is important for political theory, a rejection of the distinction between an ahistorical political theory and an apolitical intellectual history. But there is perhaps something puzzling about this. One of Skinner’s central claims is that we cannot reasonably interpret historical authors as discussing issues of contemporary relevance, but must instead attempt to understand their work as a response to their own, historically specific, concerns. How, then, could this practice of intellectual history function as a form of political theory which would have any relevance to the present? This is the question I will attempt to answer in this paper. By looking in detail at Skinner’s methodological writings, I will suggest that it is precisely the historical specificity of past works of theory which, by providing us with unfamiliar concepts, makes them useful in reflecting on the conceptual organization of contemporary politics.